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Impacts of the type of social health insurance on health service utilisation and 
expenditures: implications for a unified system in China 
 
Introduction 
Social health insurance (SHI) has expanded rapidly as a leading health 
financing tool and has increased health population coverage to many health systems 
around the world, including an increasingly large number of developing countries 
(Hsiao and Shaw, 2007). For instance, the beneficiaries of Popular Health Insurance 
(PHI) in Mexico, one of the leading performers  in SHI expansion among developing 
countries, increased from 5.2 million in 2004 at its launch, to 52.5 million in 2012 
(Rivera-Hernandez and Galarraga, 2015). Likewise, in China, individuals with SHI 
made up less than 15% of the population in 1998 when SHI schemes were first 
introduced in the formal employment sector and; by 2011, coverage had extended to 
95% (Yu, 2015). More importantly, such expansion has occurred not only in terms of 
the breadth of coverage in the population but also in the comprehensiveness of benefit 
packages and increased reimbursement rates (Wang et al., 2014). 
One of the unintended consequences of this phenomenal expansion is the 
segmentation of the SHI system across different population covered. In the case of 
China, for instance, there are three separate schemes for different groups: the Urban 
Employee Medical Insurance (UEI) scheme covers urban residents with formal 
employment, the Urban Resident Medical Insurance (URI) scheme covers the urban 
unemployed, and the New Cooperative Rural Medical Insurance Scheme (NCMS) 
covers rural residents. Based primarily on an individuals’s place of residence (i.e., rural 
or urban) and occupation, these three schemes differ considerably in terms of levels of 
premium, coverage of health services and reimbursement rates. Studies have found 
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that health care utilisation is significantly lower among the rural population enrolled 
in NCMS, as compared to the urban population enrolled in other types of SHIs (Meng 
et al., 2015). Significantly, the reimbursement rate was found to be 10% lower and 
service coverage, less comprehensive for NCMS, as compared to UEI and URI (ibid.). 
 Critically, the segmentation of SHI has led to considerable disparities in access 
to health care and financial protection across different sections of population. Studies 
have found that the NCMS had little impact on reducing out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments among low income enrollees (You and Kobayashi, 2009; Yang and Wu, 
2014); the URI scheme was also demonstrated to have driven up health costs without 
necessarily reducing OOP expenditures (Liu and Zhao, 2012). 
<Table One about here> 
<Panel One about here> 
Since January 2016, the Chinese Government has begun to phase in the Urban 
and Rural Resident Medical Insurance (URRMI) scheme across different localities 
with the aim of merging both URI and NCMS and as a first step towards eventual 
integration of all existing SHI schemes under a single payer scheme in the near future. 
Establishing a unified SHI by 2020, with the aim to close the gap of rural/urban health 
disparity by improving the benefit packages for the rural subscribers, is one of the key 
priorities of China’s health care reform (The State Council of People's Republic of 
China, 2016).   
While it is typically assumed that unifying all SHI schemes to a single insurer 
system would help to reduce disparities in access and health costs across populations 
(Hussey and Anderson, 2003), the actual impacts of such unification, however, are far 
from certain based on the experiences of a number of countries (Atun et al., 2013; 
Economics Intelligence Unit, 2014; Cheng, 2003).  While it is found that the 
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unification of five SHI schemes in Turkey in 2008 led to improved access to care, 
greater fairness in financing and increased user satisfaction (Atun et al., 2013), 
experiences in some other Asian countries indicated that the initial stages of SHI 
integration could be embroiled with fiscal challenges. Indonesia’s National health 
Insurance Scheme –‘Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional’ (JKN) – launched in January 2014 
and aims to integrate various state-owned health insurance schemes into a single payer 
SHI,  met with problems related to financial insolvency due to a surge in health care 
demand (Economics Intelligence Unit, 2014). Similarly, the expenditures of Taiwan’s 
National Health Insurance (NHI), a government-run, single-payer health insurance 
scheme, outstripped its revenues during the first few years. Although the NHI has 
made health care more publicly accessible, a study has shown that some doctors in 
Taiwan tend to over-prescribe treatments covered by the NHI scheme to generate more 
revenue for the hospitals to then multiply their revenue streams (Cheng, 2003).   
The recent policy development in China towards a unified SHI system offers a 
unique opportunity to study how the expansion and improvement of the benefit 
packages of SHI may influence health expenditures. Moving from the current system 
of the co-existence of multiple SHI schemes varying greatly in benefits to a unified 
system may entail enormous cost implications that have so far received little attention.  
Drawing data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), 
this study aims to examine the impacts of the degree of generosity of different types 
of SHI on utilisation of health services, total health costs as well as out-of-pocket 
health costs. Insights derived from this study may not only contribute directly to the 
policy discourse on current policy reform in China towards a single insurer scheme, 
but also improve our understanding on the cost and benefit calculations of various 
policy options in reforming SHI systems as policy-makers in many developing 
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countries are grappling with the challenges in expanding SHI systems towards a more 
financially sustainable future (Reich, 2016; Hsiao and Shaw, 2007).  
 
Methods  
Data source 
We drew data from the national survey of CHARLS for the years 2011 and 
2013. Commissioned by the U.S. National Institute on Aging, the World Bank, and 
the National Natural Science Foundation of China, CHARLS is an ongoing, publicly 
available, internationally collaborative project that collects data from a nationally 
representative sample of Chinese residents aged 45 and above. This dataset is well 
suited for our analysis considering that older adults and elderly populations have a 
higher propensity for health services, and the subsequent impacts on health costs may 
have more pronounced effects on them as compared to the younger population. 
Twenty-eight provinces and autonomous regions varying substantially in terms of 
geography, economic development, public resources and health indicators were 
included in the survey. The first round of CHARLS data collection was conducted in 
2011, and a follow-up survey was conducted in 2013.  
Variable specifications 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables chosen for our analysis are: (1) binary variables of the 
participation in inpatient and outpatient care conditioned upon the occurrence of 
inpatient (in the past 12 months) and outpatient (in the past four weeks) visits, and: (2) 
continuous variables of the total health costs and out-of-pocket (OOP) costs of the 
most recent inpatient (in the past 12 months) and outpatient (in the past four weeks) 
visits. Total costs were defined as total inpatient costs before insurance claims were 
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made; OOP costs were those paid by respondents after insurance claims were 
reimbursed. All costs were adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for health services in different provinces using 2011 as the base year 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2014).  
Independent variables 
The independent variables of interest for the present study are the SHI 
variables—UEI, URI, NCMS, URRMI and no insurance (individuals not enrolled in 
any health insurance schemes).  Specifically, respondents were asked to report the type 
of insurance they had utilised for the most recent inpatient and outpatient visit.  
Our analysis also controlled for a set of factors that may have influenced 
access/ costs of inpatient care. These included variables for health needs and for non-
health needs among the sample population (Jones, 2007; O’Donnell et al., 2008). For 
health needs variables, our analysis controlled for individual variances that could affect 
health conditions such as age, gender, marital status, number of chronic diseases that 
an individual reported to have, and number of limitations in Activities of Daily Living 
(ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL). ADL refers to routine 
activities that an individual tends to do every day without needing assistance. There 
are six basic ADLs: eating, bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring (walking), and 
continence. IADL refers to the activities that allow individuals to live independently 
in the community. The IADLs reported in the survey are: doing household chores, 
preparing hot meals, buying groceries, managing finances and making phone calls. 
The number of self-reported ADLs and IADLs is the aggregate measure of the severity 
of daily activity limitations. 
6 
 
 
For non-health need factors, we controlled for a set of socioeconomic variables.  
Per capita household expenditure was adjusted by household size and the demographic 
composition of the household (i.e., number of adults and children) using the 
Equivalence Scale in the past one month (Citro and Michael, 1995) (continuous 
variable in logarithm function). Education (dummy variable), average per capita 
disposable income at the provincial level for year 2011 and 2013 (continuous variable), 
and region of residence (five geographical region dummies- North, Northeast, East, 
South Central, Southwest, and Northwest, with Northwest as the reference category) 
were included in the analysis. 
We also controlled for health facilities which is a crucial supply-side factor that 
affects health utilisation and costs (Yang and Wu, 2014). Health facility variables were 
categorised into three groups (village clinics, community health centre and city 
hospitals) for outpatient analysis and two groups (village clinics, city hospitals) for 
inpatient analysis. Village clinics is the reference category. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics of the study sample.  
<Table Two about here> 
Empirical strategy 
This study incorporated both descriptive and inferential analysis. Descriptive 
analysis entailed calculating the means and standard errors of the mean costs of 
inpatient and outpatient total costs as well as OOP costs across different health 
insurance utilisations.  
Our inferential analysis involved modelling insurance variables to estimate the 
utilisation and costs of healthcare for individual participants who reported a history of 
inpatient visits within the last 12 months and outpatient visits within the last four weeks. 
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In particular, we estimated the determinants of inpatient care utilisation, total costs, 
and OOP costs for both inpatient and outpatient care using a Two-part model (2PM) 
(Jones, 2000; 2007; O’Donnell et al., 2008). The 2PM comprises firstly of a Probit 
Model to examine the probability of individual health insurance utilisation on whether 
the same individual had incurred any costs on a recent inpatient and/or outpatient visit 
as a proxy for health service utilisation, and second, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model applied to determine the relationship between health insurance utilisation and 
health costs only to the population that incurred nonzero costs. We also included 
community fixed-effects with standard errors clustered at the community-level to 
account for heterogeneity across various urban and rural communities. This decision 
was guided by our assumption that there were unobserved factors at the community 
level that were correlated with other regressors in our model (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005). 
In modelling health care costs, both the 2PM and Heckman Selection Model 
(HSM) are frequently used to analyse limited dependent variables (Dow and Norton 
2003; Norton et al. 2008). In our study, we chose to model both inpatient and outpatient 
utilisations and costs using 2PM. We had considered HSM but did not apply this model 
due to the following reasons. Theoretically, 2PM assumes that both seeking treatment 
and actual health costs incurred are independent and discrete decisions (Madden, 2008). 
On the contrary, HSM allows both decisions—seeking treatment, and health costs—
to be influenced by distinct but correlated observable and unobservable factors (Jones, 
2000; 2007). The potential health costs would have an impact on an individual’s 
decision to seek treatment in the first place. Intuitively, both treatment seeking and 
health cost decisions for outpatient treatment are unlikely to be correlated as outpatient 
costs, relative to inpatient costs, and are less crucial in influencing an individual’s 
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treatment decision. This is especially the case in China whereby inpatient treatment 
decision is highly correlated with socio-economic status, and its high cost could 
potentially deter populations, especially those from low socio-economic background, 
to seek treatment (Gong et al. 2016; Jiang et al. 2017). Considering this theoretical 
reasoning, 2PM is more suitable to model outpatient care utilisation and costs as 
opposed to HSM. We also performed statistical tests to determine whether 2PM is a 
better model than HSM by generating the inverse mills ratio (IMR) for HSM. The 
performance of HSM depends on the collinearity between the IMR, which was 
estimated from the Probit Model for the probability of seeking outpatient care, and the 
costs of outpatient care in the OLS regression model. The t-ratio test indicated that 
there was no collinearity between outpatient care decisions and costs, and the 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation which is not statistically significant, suggested that 
there is no effect of selection. Our statistical tests substantiated our theoretical 
reasoning that 2PM is more suitable than HSM in modelling outpatient utilisations and 
costs in our analysis. For inpatient treatment, there is however a likelihood of the 
presence of unobserved factors that correlate both the decisions to seek treatment and 
health costs. This is due a common belief that inpatient costs are much higher than 
outpatient costs and may therefore hinder an individual’s decision to seek treatment. 
Considering these latent factors, we could not conclude whether the zero inpatient 
costs were actual outcomes or missing potential outcomes due to an individual’s 
reluctance to seek treatment (Dow and Norton, 2003). To make a statistical decision 
on which (2PM or HSM) is a better performing model for inpatient care utilisation and 
costs, we generated an inverse mills ratio (IMR) for HSM. The t-ratio test of this 
relationship indicated that there was no collinearity between an inpatient care decision 
and costs, and the Spearman’s rank-order correlation indicated no effect on selection, 
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hence established that HSM was not the appropriate model for this analysis (Jones, 
2007). Here, we reported only the results of the 2PM for inpatient analysis. Our model 
specifications are also guided by the fact that all parametric assumptions are 
reasonably fulfilled with histograms showing fairly normal distributions of all the cost 
data. For all analyses, the computation of a variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
performed, and results indicated that multi-collinearity was not a problem. Ramsey 
tests for linear regression models and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for probit models were 
also performed, and results showed that our models did not have specification 
problems.  
 
Results 
We first compared the mean total costs and OOP costs among different SHI 
participants for both inpatient and outpatient care. Figure 1 shows the mean of total 
and OOP costs for individuals who utilised different health insurance schemes at the 
most recent inpatient visit over the last 12 months. Individuals who utilised UEI, which 
is the most generous health insurance scheme, reported mean total cost of 
RMB10,421.60 (USD1,562.45), as opposed to RMB4,707.00 (USD685.06) from 
individuals who had no health insurance. Individuals who utilised UEI, URI, URRMI 
and NCMS for their most recent inpatient visit reported a lower share of OOP costs as 
a percentage of total cost (38.9%, 54.7%, 65.6% and 56.3% respectively on average) 
as compared to their counterparts with no health insurance who paid 100% of the total 
cost out-of-pocket.   Comparison of the mean total health costs for different SHI 
schemes also indicated that people who utilised UEI incurred significantly higher cost 
per inpatient episode as compared to people who utilised other SHI schemes and 
people with no insurance. Comparing the most recent outpatient visit cost for 
10 
 
 
individuals who utilised different health insurance scheme, Figure 2 shows that 
individuals who utilised URI incurred the highest mean cost (RMB1,863.60 or 
USD279.39), followed by URRMI (RMB1,475.40 or USD221.19) and UEI 
(RMB1,4071.10 or USD2,109.66). This is in contrast to relatively lower mean scores 
reported by individuals who utilised NCMS (RMB929.70 or USD139.40), and an even 
lower mean reported by individuals who had no health insurance (RMB317.00 or 
USD46.14). As for OOP costs for most recent outpatient visit, people who reported 
health insurance utilisation in their most recent outpatient visit also incurred  lower 
share of OOP as a percentage of total cost as compared to individuals with no health 
insurance (39.4% for UEI utilisation; 53.2% for URI utilisation; 60.5% for NCMS 
utilisation and 62.6% for URRMI utilisation on average). Nevertheless, the relatively 
higher absolute out-of-pocket expenditures for health insurance enrolees as compared 
to individuals with no health insurance begets a follow up question as to whether health 
insurance enrolees have tendencies to seek more treatment in outpatient settings, hence 
incur higher absolute costs, as compared to people with no health insurance. If this 
holds true, the higher absolute costs could be perceived as desirable costs that are 
preventive in nature, potentially lowering the chance of seeking inpatient care in higher 
level facilities that are more exorbitant. If this does not hold true, it suggests that the 
financial protection effects of health insurance towards outpatient care could be 
limited. Previous studies also reported that health insurance schemes in China had not 
been able to reduce out of pocket payment among the enrolees (Wagstaff and 
Lindelow, 2008; Yang and Wu, 2014; Liu and Zhao, 2012). Our data does not allow 
us to decipher the underlying reason behind this trend. However, understanding the 
reasons behind the broad trends of higher absolute outpatient out-of-pocket 
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expenditures among health insurance enrolees would be an interesting and important 
question to undertake in the future.  
<Figure One and Figure Two about here> 
We subsequently attempted to disentangle the effects of different health 
insurance schemes of various generosity levels to both inpatient and outpatient care 
utilisations and health costs. We employed health insurance utilisation as the 
independent variable of interest. We reported the results of the 2PM estimating the 
effects of different health insurance schemes to an individual’s decision to utilise both 
inpatient and outpatient treatment, as well as the incurrence of inpatient and outpatient 
costs by comparing total costs before insurance reimbursement with OOP costs after 
insurance reimbursement in Table Three.  
Results showed that, ceteris paribus, all health insurance participants were 
associated with a higher likelihood to use inpatient care as compared to the uninsured. 
The results for UEI, URI and NCMS are statistically significant (p<0.01). The 
magnitude of increase in using inpatient care for UEI, URI, an NCMS participants 
were 18.4%, 16.3% and 9.7% respectively as compared to the uninsured. Turning to 
the health costs, ceteris paribus, utilisations of UEI, NCMS and URRMI schemes were 
significantly associated with higher total inpatient costs prior to insurance 
reimbursement as compared to the uninsured. In particular, per episode total inpatient 
costs ran approximately 72.2% higher for UEI participants, 42.0% higher for NCMS 
participants and 57.5% higher for URRMI participants as compared to the uninsured, 
suggesting that more generous insurance is associated with higher health consumption 
for the users. Health insurance utilisations have no significant effects to out-of-pocket 
expenditures among all health insurance enrolees as compared to the uninsured.   
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In terms of outpatient care, the broad trend shows that across China, health 
insurance schemes appeared to have negative associations with the  decisions to utilise 
outpatient care. UEI, URI and NCMS, for instance, indicated statistically significant 
reductions in probability of seeking outpatient care as compared to the uninsured. This 
finding may appear bizarre, but further analysis of the data shows that on average, only 
about half of the health insurance enrolees ended up using health insurance in their 
most recent outpatient visit.1 This suggests that health insurance has less influence on 
making individual outpatient care decisions as compared to inpatient care decisions. 
Findings for the costs incurred for outpatient care consequent to SHI utilisations 
corresponded with those of inpatient care, with UEI and NCMS participants shown to 
be associated with significantly higher total outpatient costs as compared to the 
uninsured. There are no significant associations between all health insurance 
utilisations with outpatient out-of-pocket expenditures, except for NCMS utilisation, 
which was found to associate with significantly higher OOP outpatient costs 
(approximately 30.4%) as compared to the uninsured. 
<Table Three about here> 
We performed sensitivity analyses, replacing the control ‘number of 
limitations in ADLs and IADLs’ with ‘number of chronic diseases an individual 
reported to have’, a highly correlated variable, to check for robustness of our 
regression models. Our sensitivity analyses correspond with our main results. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study sheds light on the relationships between health insurance 
generosities and health seeking behaviours, and the subsequent health costs incurred 
among the adult population aged 45 and above in China. UEI, the health insurance 
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scheme that endows its enrolees with the most generous benefits, tends to incur the 
highest total pre-reimbursement inpatient health costs than the other health insurance 
enrolees. The same situation in which the most generous SHI tends to incur the highest 
charges among patients with the same types of medical conditions has been reported 
in other countries such as Germany (Krobot et al., 2004) and Thailand (Ngorsuraches 
and Ungsopanit, 2004). In addition, studies conducted in the U.S. (Huttin, 2007), 
Korea (Suh et al., 2014), and Mexico (Rivera-Hernandez and Galarraga, 2015) also 
demonstrated that a patient’s health insurance status did have some influence in 
determining their access to certain treatment regimens. Our findings suggest that more 
generous health insurance schemes such as UEI and URI tend to induce higher health 
consumption as compared to less generous health insurance schemes such as NCMS. 
The uninsured, likewise, incurred the lowest total mean health costs, which can be 
explained by their propensity to underutilise treatment due to lack of protection.  Our 
findings point to a more marked effect of supplier-induced demand – a phenomenon 
that has been widely documented in China due to the profit-driven nature of providers 
in the public health care landscape (Yip and Hsiao, 2009; Zhang et al., 2015) - for 
individuals with more generous health insurance schemes.  
In terms of OOP payments, the participation in SHI schemes did not result in 
statistically significant differences in OOP payments for its participants in outpatient 
care as compared to participants with no insurance. The reductions of OOP payments 
in inpatient care, were all insignificant.  Moreover, NCMS utilisations were associated 
with significant increase in OOP payments for outpatient care. Consistent with 
previous studies examining the effects of China’s SHI on financial protection to its 
enrolees, our findings provide limited support to the claim that participation in SHI 
would lead to a reduction in OOP payment.  (Yang and Wu, 2014; You and Kobayashi, 
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2011). More important, while it is politically popular to make SHI more generous, it 
should not be taken for granted that more generous SHI schemes will reduce the 
financial burden of those insured. The NCMS participants, notably, have shown to 
receive hardly any financial protection in terms of OOP payment reductions.  
The higher probability of inpatient care participation as opposed to outpatient 
care participation observed from the findings in this study is not entirely surprising. 
The higher tendency to favour inpatient care over outpatient care among the Chinese 
citizens is most likely a result of how health resources are historically allocated in 
China. A disproportionately higher medical investments have always been allocated 
to the second-tiered and third-tiered health care institutions such as big hospitals in the 
urban areas as compared to first-tiered health care institutions such as village health 
centres since the 1980s. This situation started at a time when free market economy 
became the central tenet in driving many areas of public policy reforms in China 
(Blumenthal and Hsiao 2015; Cheng et al 2017). Besides, there exists a sense of 
distrust toward the primary health system among the citizens (Cheng et al 2017), and 
also a stronger preference to choose higher-tiered health care institutions when 
deciding on treatment due to a general perception that these institutions are able to 
provide a higher quality of care (Hu et al 2016). Even though social health insurance 
expansion has been launched more than a decade ago and has been fairly effective in 
improving health access (Blumenthal and Hsiao 2015), findings from our study 
suggest that there is a need for more policy attention to be placed on strengthening 
outpatient care provision at the primary health system level.  
Since the launch of URRMI by the Chinese government in early 2016, there 
has been a strong push  to merge this with the UEI scheme at the prefecture (county) 
level in China as the first step towards unification (He and Wu, 2016). Our findings 
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have important policy implications for policy-makers in China and other developing 
countries that are contemplating a transition from a multiple-payer SHI system to a 
single payer SHI system that unifies all existing schemes. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom that a single payer SHI system that unifies all existing SHI schemes is  more 
efficient (Hussey and Anderson, 2003), our findings suggest that a move  towards a 
unified SHI scheme that is more generous than some of the existing SHI schemes may 
give rise to health expenditure escalation, which would result in cost burden to the 
government and individual participants, in part due to the perverse incentives inherent 
in the current fee-for-service provider payment system in China that reimburses health 
providers based on the quantity of services delivered. The over supplying of services 
and over prescribing of treatment have become norms in medical practices as means 
to generate additional revenues for the providers.  
In recent years, various cost control measures, such as the separation of revenue 
generation responsibilities and expenditure systems in the health facilities, introducing 
more transparent pharmaceutical procurement systems, and implementing national 
standard clinical guidelines were proposed as tangible measures that could be taken at 
institutional level to contain health costs in China (Tang and Bekedam, 2012). The 
effectiveness of these measures in overcoming perverse incentives is of critical 
importance to the success of the unification of SHI. 
Besides the above policy options, governance mechanisms ought to be 
strengthened alongside institutional design reforms in the SHI system. In most 
countries, strengthening the accountability structures to detect fraud and abuse is a 
pivotal step in cost control. Experience in Taiwan demonstrated that building a 
monitoring system to detect malpractice, and ensure cost sharing is enforced on the 
population who did not have to pay for health care previously, stood as an effective 
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check and balance in controlling cost (Lu and Hsiao, 2003). In addition, with the 
dramatic rise in public health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure 
in China from 33.6% in 2001 to 55.8% in 2014 (The World Bank, 2016), reconfiguring 
the incentive structures within the provider payment systems is another cost control 
measure that ought to be considered. Literature on provider payment system have 
generated a general consensus that controlling all other factors, prospective payment 
systems tend to contain cost better than retrospective payment systems (Jegers et al., 
2002; Roberts et al., 2008). The Korean experience indicates that with increased health 
access and rising health demand under a unified SHI system, a shift towards a 
prospective provider payment system is inevitable (Kwon, 2009). A recent study that 
assessed three cities in China piloting mixed provider payment methods indicated that 
both a prospective (capitation and global budget) and retrospective (fee-for-service, 
case-based payment and unit flat rate) financing mix showed positive impacts on the 
cost control of health care (Tang and Bekedam, 2012). These positive outcomes 
indicate that a gradual shift in provider payment system from the current fee-for-
service provider payment method to prospective system such as capitation and global 
budget in China is the way forward.  
As China moves towards the eventual policy goal of integrating SHI schemes 
into a unified system, many institutional design aspects of unification, which include 
resetting acceptable premium rates to different segments of the population, optimising 
cost-sharing levels in the form of deductibles and co-payments, and standardising 
service provisions across the country, warrant careful deliberations (Meng et al., 2015; 
Yu, 2015).  Likewise, an SHI system that ensures social solidarity necessitates the rich 
to subsidise the poor. Doing this without causing political backlash requires savvy 
political acumen. Over time, the government needs to find ways to effectively enhance 
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premium revenue collection - especially from the self-employed and informal sector 
employees - to ensure political and fiscal sustainability of the system (Hsiao and Shaw, 
2007). A unified SHI system that strictly observes cost containment also requires the 
government to effectively command its monopsony power and strategic purchasing. 
Solutions towards the challenges above, however, are beyond the scopes of this study. 
This study possesses two limitations. While demonstrating that more generous 
health insurance schemes lead to higher total health costs, such a relation is at most 
associative. We acknowledge that there might be both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneities in terms of the design of different SHI schemes across different 
Chinese localities, and we have attempted to address this by incorporating regional 
controls and community fixed-effects to account for geographical heterogeneities in 
our analysis. Besides, we acknowledge the limitation of using self-reported household 
survey data for our analyses, which could be subject to reporting bias. Our study 
provides an initial insight into the implication of a unified SHI system in China. 
Moving forward, the examination of the mechanisms that drive-up health costs for 
different SHI schemes would be a meaningful research endeavour. Understanding this 
could provide more profound policy insights to the policy-makers in the face of 
ongoing SHI reform and expansion in China.  
 
Endnote: 
1 Details of this analysis are available upon request. 
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Table One: Key features of NCMS, UEI, URI and URRMI  
  NCMS UEI URI URRMI 
Date started 2003 (Pilot 
scheme was 
initiated in 
four 
provinces) 
1998 (pilot 
scheme was 
initiated in 
1994) 
Pilot since 
2007 
Rolled out in 
phases since 
January 2016 
Target 
population 
Rural residents Urban 
employee 
Urban 
residents 
without formal 
employment 
Urban 
residents 
without formal 
employment 
and rural 
residents 
Enrollment  Participation is 
usually 
voluntary at 
household 
level but could 
be enforced 
once the 
county joins 
the NCMS.  
Participation is 
mandatory for 
all urban 
residents with 
formal 
employment. 
Voluntary 
(household 
level) 
Voluntary 
Coverage 805 million 
rural 
population 
271 million 
urban 
employees 
264 million 
urban residents 
Those who are 
not covered 
under the UEI 
scheme 
Risk pooling County level City level City level County level 
Reimbursement 
rate, ceiling 
and deductibles 
Deductibles, 
reimbursement 
rates, and 
ceilings are set 
by the county 
governments. 
The rates 
depend largely 
on the types of 
health 
providers.  
Deductibles, 
reimbursement 
rates, and 
ceilings are set 
by the city 
government. 
The rates 
depend largely 
on the types of 
health 
providers.  
City 
government 
sets the 
reimbursement 
rate, ceilings, 
and 
deductibles. 
However, 
deductibles, 
reimbursement 
rates, and 
ceilings are 
different for 
children, 
elderly, and 
other urban 
residents. 
These rates 
also depend on 
the types of 
health 
providers.  
Deductibles, 
reimbursement 
rates, and 
ceilings are set 
by the county 
governments. 
The rates 
depend largely 
on the types of 
health 
providers. 
Financing 
mechanism 
In western and 
central China, 
the central 
government 
A total of 8% 
of employees’ 
monthly 
payroll needs 
In general, an 
annual 
premium 
provided by 
In the 
preliminary 
phase, 
financing 
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assisted the 
local 
government in 
providing 
finance for the 
scheme. In the 
more affluent 
eastern and 
coastal 
regions, 
financing the 
premium was 
mainly 
through local 
governments. 
Government 
subsidies 
increased from 
42.1RMB in 
2005 to 
308.5RMB in 
2012.  
to be 
contributed to 
the scheme, 
with the 
employee 
paying 2% and 
the employer 
paying the 
remaining 6%.  
the 
government 
should be no 
less than 
40RMB per 
year per 
person.  In 
addition, the 
government 
provide extra 
subsidies to 
the disabled 
children, 
children from 
poor families, 
poor disabled 
elderly above 
60. Insured 
urban residents 
who live in 
affluent 
provinces are 
likely to 
receive better 
benefit 
packages 
compared with 
those who live 
in less affluent 
provinces.  
mechanism 
differs in each 
county. 
Generally, 
premiums are 
financed via a 
combination of 
self-
contribution 
and 
government 
subsidies. 
Designated 
health facilities  
All levels of 
public health 
facilities. 
All levels of 
public health 
facilities. 
All levels of 
public health 
facilities. 
All levels of 
public health 
facilities. 
Covered 
services 
Inpatient 
services, 
catastrophic 
outpatient 
services, some 
prevention 
care services. 
Inpatient 
services 
catastrophic 
outpatient 
services, some 
prevention 
care services. 
Mainly cover 
inpatient 
services and 
catastrophic 
outpatient 
services. 
Inpatient 
services (up to 
75%) and 
outpatient 
services. 
Sources: Barber and Yao 2010; Shen 2014; Meng et al. 2015 
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Table Two: Summary statistics 
    Inpatient (N=1,309) 
Outpatient 
(N=2,467) 
Variable Definitions Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Health Insurance utilisation   
UEI  
Dummy variable: 1, UEI; 0 
otherwise 0.206 0.404 0.096 0.295 
URI  
Dummy variable: 1, URI; 0 
otherwise 0.052 0.222 0.016 0.126 
NCMS  
Dummy variable: 1, NCMS; 0 
otherwise 0.661 0.474 0.330 0.470 
URRMI  
Dummy variable: 1, URRMI; 0 
otherwise 0.020 0.138 0.008 0.089 
No insurance 
 
Dummy variable: 1, No 
insurance; 0 otherwise 0.062 0.241 0.549 0.498 
Demographics       
Male 
Dummy variable: 1, male; 0 
female 0.528 0.499 0.428 0.495 
Age 
Continuous variable: age of the 
respondent 61.63 9.82 60.24 9.93 
Education 
 
Dummy variable: 1, has formal 
education; 0, no formal education 
0.753 
 
0.431 
 
0.716 
 
0.451 
 
Married 
 
Dummy variable: 1, married; 0, 
single or divorced 
0.804 
 
0.397 
 
0.851 
 
0.356 
 
Household per 
capita 
expenditure 
 
Continuous variable: inflation-
adjusted per capita household 
expenditure  
25731
.43 
 
 
33333.14 
 
 
20807.
14 
 
 
32769.21 
 
 
Functional & health status     
# of ADLs and 
IADLs 
Count variable: number of 
limitations in activities of daily 
living (ADL) and instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADL) 
0.598 
 
1.595 
 
0.522 
 
1.471 
 
Medical 
facilities      
Hospital 
Dummy variable: 1, hospital; 0 
otherwise 0.804 0.397 0.358 0.480 
Community 
health centre 
Dummy variable: 1, community 
health centre; 0 otherwise 0.196 0.397 0.295 0.456 
Village health 
centre 
 
Dummy variable: 1, village 
health centre; 0 otherwise - - 0.338 0.473 
Health costs      
Total cost per 
episode 
(inpatient) 
Continuous variable: total 
inpatient cost for the most recent 
visit in the past 12 months 
7700.
30 
 
9668.44 
 - - 
OOP cost per 
episode 
(inpatient) 
Continuous variable: OOP 
inpatient cost for the most recent 
visit in the past 12 months 
4714.
46 
 
6665.86 
 - - 
Total cost per 
episode 
(outpatient) 
Continuous variable: total 
outpatient cost for the most 
recent visit in the past 1 month - - 580.23 1290.55 
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OOP cost per 
episode 
(outpatient) 
Continuous variable: OOP 
outpatient cost for the most 
recent visit in the past 1 month - - 392.23 847.68 
Regional characteristics and year     
Provincial 
disposable 
income 
Continuous variable: average 
disposable income at provincial 
level 
15050
.88 
 
8630.94 
 
13953.
73 
 
9055.15 
 
Region: north 
Dummy variable: 1, north; 0 
otherwise 0.111 0.315 0.103 0.304 
Region: 
northeast 
Dummy variable: 1, northeast; 0 
otherwise 0.083 0.276 0.046 0.210 
Region: east 
Dummy variable: 1, east; 0 
otherwise 0.237 0.425 0.296 0.457 
Region: south 
central 
Dummy variable: 1, south 
central; 0 otherwise 0.267 0.442 0.262 0.440 
Region: 
southwest 
Dummy variable: 1, southwest; 0 
otherwise 0.206 0.404 0.211 0.408 
Region: 
northwest 
Dummy variable: 1, northwest; 0 
otherwise 0.087 0.283 0.072 0.258 
Year Dummy variable:1,2011;  0,2013 0.544 0.498 0.732 0.443 
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Table Three: Two-Part Model for treatment utilisation and costs (inpatient and 
outpatient) 
VARIABLES Inpatient Care Outpatient Care 
Participatio
n 
Total costs OOP costs Participatio
n 
Total costs OOP costs 
       
UEI  0.743*** 0.722*** -0.243 -0.798*** 1.053*** 0.187 
 (0.181) (0.208) (0.257) (0.152) (0.254) (0.266) 
URI  0.658*** 0.281 -0.224 -0.776*** 0.609 -0.006 
 (0.237) (0.280) (0.278) (0.245) (0.600) (0.507) 
NCMS  0.393*** 0.420** -0.024 -0.378*** 0.750*** 0.304*** 
 (0.132) (0.173) (0.189) (0.100) (0.100) (0.095) 
URRMI 0.316 0.575* 0.169 -0.143 0.447 0.020 
 (0.282) (0.320) (0.344) (0.366) (0.446) (0.428) 
Constant -0.794 -1.623 4,037 4.583*** 19.958 35.455 
 (1.529) (3.006) (3.481) (1.687) (25.133) (24.254) 
       
Observations 1,605 1,327 1,327 2,684 2,488 2,488 
R-squared - 0.580 0.528 - 0.511 0.479 
Community 
fixed-effects 
- Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Regional 
controls 
Yes - - Yes - - 
 
 Notes:  
a. The probit model for health service utilisation  controls for individual  characteristics 
(gender, age, age-square, education, marital status), individual economic status (per 
capita household consumption expenditure), individual health and functional status 
(total number of activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADL) that one has difficulty with), , level of health facilities, and regional 
characteristics (average provincial disposable income and regional dummies), with 
survey year 2011 as the reference.  
b. The OLS model for total costs and OOP costs controls for individual characteristics 
(gender, age, age-square, education, marital status), individual economic status (per 
capita household consumption expenditure), individual health and functional status 
(total number of activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADL) that one has difficulty with), level of health facilities, and regional 
characteristics (average provincial disposable income), with survey year 2011 as the 
reference. Community-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the community-
level were included in the model. 
c. * indicates significant at the 10% level; ** indicates significant at the 5% level; *** 
indicates significant at the 1% level. 
d. Sensitivity analyses replaced a control ‘number of limitations in ADLs and IADLs’ 
with ‘number of chronic diseases one reported to have’ as alternative to control for 
individual health and functional status. 
e. The full main results and sensitivity analyses are available at online appendix. 
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Panel One: Types of Social Health Insurance Schemes in China  
• Urban Employee Insurance (UEI)  
UEI is compulsory for all employees and their employers in the formal urban sector. The 
insurance premium is set at 8% of each employee’s monthly wage, comprised of a 2% 
contribution from the employee and the remaining 6% from the employer.  The expansion 
of UEI has been rapid and remarkable: participation increased from 118 million urban 
employees in 2005 to 271 million in 2012 (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission of China 2014). UEI has the most generous benefit package among the three 
SHI schemes. 
• Urban Resident Insurance (URI)  
The URI covers urban residents who are not employed in the formal sector (the self-
employed, unemployed, old/retired, young children and primary and secondary school 
students) and is a voluntary enrolment scheme, where government subsidies have been used 
to encourage increased participation. The enrolment increased from 118.2 million in 2008 
to 271.2 million as of 2012 (National Health and Family Planning Commission of China 
2014). 
• New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) 
The majority of the rural population has been covered by NCMS since 2003. Subsidised 
largely by central and local governments, NCMS is administrated at county level, and the 
individual participant’s contribution to the premium is kept relatively low.  NCMS coverage 
soon became a key performance indicator for prominent government officials.  The benefit 
package of NCMS, rudimentary at the outset, has become more comprehensive over time 
largely due to a massive injection of government subsidies: annual government contribution 
to insurance premiums increased from 42.1RMB in 2005 to 308.05RMB in 2012. Since 
2007, NCMS benefits have expanded, at first mainly covering catastrophic illnesses, but 
now including outpatient and preventive care (Xinhua 2012).  
• Urban and Rural Resident Medical Insurance (URRMI)  
URRMI was piloted in a few cities and has been rolled out in phases since January 2016. It 
was first established with the intention of integrating URI and NCMS schemes as the 
premiums of both schemes are heavily subsidised by the government, unlike UEI, which is 
contributory. URRMI is considered as the first move of the larger government initiative to 
integrate all existing SHI schemes under a single payer scheme in the near future (Xinhua 
2016). 
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Figure One: Comparison of the mean of most recent inpatient total and OOP costs 
across different health insurance schemes (mean/standard error) 
 
Note: 1 % indicates percentage of inpatient OOP mean cost out of inpatient total mean 
cost. 2 All costs are measured in Chinese RMB. 
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Figure Two: Comparison of the mean of most recent outpatient total and OOP costs 
across different health insurance schemes (mean/standard error) 
 
 
Note: 1 % indicates percentage of outpatient OOP mean cost out of outpatient total mean 
cost. 2 All costs are measured in Chinese RMB. 
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